What Is Habeas Corpus

What Is Habeas Corpus

Habeas corpus, or the Great Writ, is the legal procedure that keeps the government from holding you indefinitely without showing cause. When you challenge your detention by filing a habeas corpus petition, the executive branch must explain to a neutral judge its justification for holding you. Habeas corpus prevents the King from simply locking up subjects in secret dungeons and throwing away the key. It’s been a pillar of Western law since the signing of the Magna Carta in England in 1215.

The Founders of our nation believed habeas corpus was so essential to preserving liberty, justice, and democracy that they enshrined it in the very first article of the United States Constitution.

What happened to habeas corpus?

In its waning days, the last Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. Among many ill-considered and dangerous provisions, the MCA revoked the right to habeas corpus for anyone detained at Guantánamo Bay as well as for any foreigner the government detains anywhere and labels an “enemy combatant.” This provision applies to legal residents of the U.S. as well, meaning someone who has lived in the U.S. for years could potentially be labeled an “enemy combatant” and then thrown into prison with no legal recourse to challenge their detention.

How does it relate to Guantanamo?

The government has little or no evidence against most of the men detained at Guantánamo. We now know that almost none of the Guantánamo prisoners were taken into custody by U.S. forces or captured on any battlefield. The overwhelming majority were sold into captivity by Northern Alliance and Pakistani warlords for substantial bounties—$5,000 and more for each person they turned in; enough money, as leaflets the U.S. military distributed throughout Afghanistan said, “to take care of your family . . . for the rest of your life.” In fact, of the nearly 800 men that have been held at Guantánamo, only 10 have ever been charged with any crime.

Soon after the first 20 detainees were flown to Guantánamo, CCR began filing habeas corpus petitions asking the government to explain why it was holding these men outside of the reach of the U.S. court system in what has since become a notorious offshore penal colony. Despite numerous legal victories that affirm the detainees’ right to challenge their detention, the Bush administration has managed to prevent the detainees from getting a fair hearing in the courts.

What does it mean for the detainees?

In June 2007, the Supreme Court decided to hear CCR’s most recent case challenging the detention of many Guantanamo detainees. These men have faced indefinite detention, sham trials, and conditions rapidly inducing psychological deterioration for nearly six years. In the coming Supreme Court term, for the third time, the high court will hear the detainees’ cases and, we hope, once more seek to hold the Administration accountable and uphold habeas corpus.

The MCA extends a second-class system of justice far beyond Guantánamo to any non-citizen – including legal permanent residents of the U.S. – anywhere in the world whom the executive unilaterally declares to be an “unlawful enemy combatant.”

What does it mean for everyone else?

Habeas corpus was originally meant to act as a bulwark precisely against this type of executive power. The founders of our nation considered habeas corpus the most fundamental of rights because it insured that the executive branch could not hold people without cause. Since the founding of the U.S., the writ has been suspended on only four occasions, each for a brief period of time and each in territory that was an active combat zone.
By compromising this core legal value and necessary protection against the executive branch, the MCA has eroded the very foundation of our legal and constitutional framework. If we do not defend the right to habeas corpus, we all lose.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article is about the legal term. For other uses, see Habeas corpus (disambiguation).

/; Latin: "you may have the body") is a writ (court order) that requires a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court.^[1][2] The principle of habeas corpus ensures that a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention—that is, detention lacking sufficient cause or evidence. The remedy can be sought by the prisoner or by another person coming to the prisoner's aid. This right originated in the English legal system, and is now available in many nations. It has historically been an important legal instrument safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary state action. It has been extended to non-police authorities, as in the 1898 Queen's Bench case of Ex Parte Dorothy Hopkins, which has successfully been utilized more recently in India to liberate a woman from a madrasa.

A writ of habeas corpus, also known as the "great writ", is a summons with the force of a court order; it is addressed to the custodian (a prison official for example) and demands that a prisoner be taken before the court, and that the custodian present proof of authority, allowing the court to determine whether the custodian has lawful authority to detain the prisoner. If the custodian is acting beyond his authority, then the prisoner must be released. Any prisoner, or another person acting on his or her behalf, may petition the court, or a judge, for a writ of habeas corpus. One reason for the writ to be sought by a person other than the prisoner is that the detainee might be held incommunicado. Most civil law jurisdictions provide a similar remedy for those unlawfully detained, but this is not always called "habeas corpus".^[3] For example, in some Spanish-speaking nations, the equivalent remedy for unlawful imprisonment is the amparo de libertad ('protection of freedom').

Habeas corpus has certain limitations. It is technically only a procedural remedy; it is a guarantee against any detention that is forbidden by law, but it does not necessarily protect other rights, such as the entitlement to a fair trial. So if an imposition such as internment without trial is permitted by the law, then habeas corpus may not be a useful remedy. In some countries, the process has been temporarily or permanently suspended, in all of a government's jurisdictions or only some, because of what might be construed by some government institutions as a series of events of such relevance to the government as to warrant a suspension; in more recent times, such events may have been frequently referred to as "national emergencies."

The right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus has nonetheless long been celebrated as the most efficient safeguard of the liberty of the subject. The jurist Albert Venn Dicey wrote that the British Habeas Corpus Acts "declare no principle and define no rights, but they are for practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty".^[4]

The writ of habeas corpus is one of what are called the "extraordinary", "common law", or "prerogative writs", which were historically issued by the English courts in the name of the monarch to control inferior courts and public authorities within the kingdom. The most common of the other such prerogative writs are quo warranto, prohibito, mandamus, procedendo, andcertiorari. The due process for such petitions is not simply civil or criminal, because they incorporate the presumption of non-authority. The official who is the respondent must prove his authority to do or not do something. Failing this, the court must decide for the petitioner, who may be any person, not just an interested party. This differs from a motion in a civil process in which the movant must have standing, and bears the burden of proof.

Habeas corpus

Latin for "that you have the body." A writ of habeas corpus is used to bring a prisoner or other detainee (e.g. institutionalized mental patient) before the court to determine if the person's imprisonment or detention is lawful. In the US system, federal courts can use the writ of habeas corpus to determine if a state's detention of a prisoner is valid.  A habeaspetition proceeds as a civil action against the State agent (usually a warden) who holds the defendant in custody. It can also be used to examine any extradition processes used, amount of bail, and the jurisdiction of the court.

See, e.g. Knowles v. Mirzayance 556 U.S.___(2009),  Felker v. Turpin 518 US 1051 (1996) and McCleskey v. Zant 499 US 467 (1991).

Overview

     Habeas corpus is a writ that is used to bring a party who has been criminally convicted in state court into federal court. Usually, writs of habeas corpus are used to review the legality of the party’s arrest, imprisonment, or detention. The federal court’s review of a habeas corpus petition is considered to be collateral relief of a state court decision rather than direct review.

     Habeas corpus originated in English common law as a means to protect individuals from illegal detention. An individual who had been held in custody could file a petition seeking a writ which would require the custodian to provide adequate legal justification for the detention. If the custodian failed to do so, the court could order the petitioner’s release.

     Today, habeas corpus is mainly used as a post-conviction remedy for state or federal prisoners who challenge the legality of the application of federal laws that were used in the judicial proceedings that resulted in their detention. Other uses of habeas corpus include immigration or deportation cases and matters concerning military detentions, court proceedings before military commissions, and convictions in military court. Finally, habeas corpus is used to determine preliminary matters in criminal cases, such as: (i) an adequate basis for detention; (ii) removal to another federal district court; (iii) the denial of bail or parole; (iv) a claim of double jeopardy; (v) the failure to provide for a speedy trial or hearing; or (vi) the legality of extradition to a foreign country.

     The sources of habeas corpus can be found in the Constitution, statutory law, and case law. The Suspension Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, Clause 2), states: “The Privileges of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion of Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Although the Constitution does not specifically create the right to habeas corpus relief, federal statutes provide federal courts with the authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners. Only Congress has the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, either by its own affirmative actions or through an express delegation to the Executive. The Executive does not have the independent authority to suspend the writ.

     In the First Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress explicitly authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to federal prisoners. Congress expanded the writ following the Civil War, allowing for habeas relief to state prisoners if they were held in custody in violation of federal law. Federal courts granted habeas relief to state prisoners by finding that the state court lacked the proper jurisdiction. Post-World War II reforms further expanded the writ: through the incorporation process by which the Bill of Rights was applied to the states, habeas corpus became a tool by which criminal defendants sought to uphold their civil rights against illegal state action. The Warren Court further paved the way for broader habeas corpus rights.

     In 1996, Congress narrowed the writ of habeas corpus through the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA has three important aspects: first, it imposes a one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions. Second, unless a United States Court of Appeals gave its approval, a petitioner may not file successive habeas corpus petitions. Third, habeas relief is only available when the state court’s determination was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”

     The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) further narrowed the scope of habeas relief, providing that prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay may not access the federal courts through habeas corpus; instead, they must go through the military commissions and then seek appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court. However, the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush (2008) expanded the territorial reach of habeas corpus, ruling that the Suspension Clause affirmatively guaranteed the right to habeas review. Thus, alien detainees designated as enemy combatants who were held outside the United States had the constitutional right to habeas corpus.

     Federal statutes (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2256) outline the procedural aspects of federal habeas proceedings. There are two prerequisites for habeas review: the petitioner must be in custody when the petition is filed, and a prisoner who is held in state government custody must have exhausted all state remedies, including state appellate review. Any federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who is within its jurisdiction. The habeas petition must be in writing and signed and verified either by the petitioner seeking relief or by someone acting on his or her behalf. The petition must name the custodian as the respondent and state the facts concerning the applicant’s custody and include the legal basis for the request. Federal courts are not required to hear the petition if a previous petition presented the same issues and no new grounds were brought up. Finally, a federal judge may dismiss the petition for the writ of habeas corpus if it is clear from the face of the petition that there are no possible grounds for relief.

Habeas Corpus

Lat. "you have the body" Prisoners often seek release by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate to a prison official ordering that an inmate be brought to the court so it can be determined whether or not that person is imprisoned lawfully and whether or not he should be released from custody. A habeas corpus petition is a petition filed with a court by a person who objects to his own or another's detention or imprisonment. The petition must show that the court ordering the detention or imprisonment made a legal or factual error. Habeas corpus petitions are usually filed by persons serving prison sentences. In family law, a parent who has been denied custody of his child by a trial court may file a habeas corpus petition. Also, a party may file a habeas corpus petition if a judge declares her in contempt of court and jails or threatens to jail her.

In Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), the court observed that the Supreme Court has "recognized the fact that`[t]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.' Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). " Therefore, the writ must be "administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." Harris, 394 U.S. at 291.

The writ of habeas corpus serves as an important check on the manner in which state courts pay respect to federal constitutional rights. The writ is "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). Because the habeas process delays the finality of a criminal case, however, the Supreme Court in recent years has attempted to police the writ to ensure that the costs of the process do not exceed its manifest benefits. In McCleskey the Court raised barriers against successive and abusive petitions. The Court raised these barriers based on significant concerns about delay, cost, prejudice to the prosecution, frustration of the sovereign power of the States, and the "heavy burden" federal collateral litigation places on "scarce federal judicial resources," a burden that "threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes." McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 467.

The Court observed that"[t]he writ of habeas corpus is one of the centerpieces of our liberties. `But the writ has potentialities for evil as well as for good. Abuse of the writ may undermine the orderly administration of justice and therefore weaken the forces of authority that are essential for civilization.' " McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 496 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1952) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.))

The predominant inquiry on habeas is a legal one: whether the "petitioner's custody simpliciter" is valid as measured by the Constitution. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). The purpose of the great writ is not to relitigate state trials.

Dismissal of habeas petition under the "total exhaustion" rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) (each claim raised by petitioner must be exhausted before district court may reach the merits of any claim in habeas petition). Jury exposure to facts not in evidence deprives a defendant of the rights to confrontation, cross-examination and assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment. Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (introduction of extraneous prior bad acts evidence during deliberations constitutes error of constitutional proportions), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1294 (1994). However, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be established that the constitutional error had "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 & n.9 (1993). Whether the constitutional error was harmless is not a factual determination entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405; Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987).

In a habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court generally "will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553-54 (1991). This doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review when the state court has declined to address the petitioner's federal claims because he failed to meet state procedural requirements. Id. at 2254; see also Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 119 L. Ed. 2d 326, 337 (1992). Thus, the independent state grounds doctrine bars the federal courts from reconsidering the issue in the context of habeas corpus review as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for its decision. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1988).

Habeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994-95 (1995). It is the responsibility of the court, once it concludes there was error, to determine whether the error affected the judgment. If the court is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. Id. On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, like the standard of review for a claim of judicial misconduct, is " 'the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.' " Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). "The relevant question is whether the prosecutor['s] comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' " Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643).

A federal court has no supervisory authority over criminal proceedings in state courts. The only standards we can impose on the states are those dictated by the Constitution. Daye, 712 F.2d at 1571. Objectionable as some actions might be, when considered in the context of the trial as a whole they are not "of sufficient gravity to warrant the conclusion that fundamental fairness has been denied." Id. at 1572. See Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d at 807 (trial judge's caustic, sarcastic comments and offensive conduct, although perhaps inconsistent with institutional standards of federal courts, did not violate due process); Daye, 712 F.2d at 1572 (trial judge's skeptical attitude toward defendant's testimony, and his reinforcement of identification evidence by government witnesses, "approached but did not cross the line that permits [a ruling] that the Constitution has been violated").

The fact that a jury instruction is inadequate by Federal Court direct appeal standards does not mean a petitioner who relies on such an inadequacy will be entitled to habeas relief from a state court conviction. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). In habeas proceedings challenging state court convictions, relief is available only for constitutional violations. Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. at 147 (constitutionality determined not by focusing on ailing instruction "in artificial isolation" but by considering effect of instruction "in the context of the overall charge."). See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977) (recognizing that "[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law" and, therefore, a habeas petitioner whose claim of error involves the failure to give a particular instruction bears an "especially heavy" burden).

Shackling, except in extreme forms, is susceptible to harmless error analysis. Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d at 669. In a habeas case dealing with a state court sentence, the question is whether the shackling "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (1993)). If we are in "grave doubt" whether the error affected the verdict, the error is not harmless. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995).

The risk of doubt, however, is on the state. Id. at 996 (rejecting language in Brecht v. Abrahamson which places on defendant burden of showing prejudice). See Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d at 149 (finding shackling at trial harmless error because defendant only wore waist chain that could not be seen by jury).

MAKLUMAT MAYA